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The annual Feminist Night March in Istanbul has been the most cheerful, vivid and
peaceful demonstration of Turkey’s civil society since 2003. Despite the venue
restrictions imposed by the government and the use of tear gas during the marches
of 2019, the organizers of rallies have scheduled the events to mark the International
Women’s Day on 8 March 2020. The demonstrations have seen a very high number
of participants including feminist NGOs, families of murdered women, and citizens
from all ages, but under heightened police presence, blockade, and tear gas. The
march is definitely another case study on the civic engagement of human rights
defenders in repressive contexts. Complementing the discussions on the endurance
and containment of civic activism, the recent Gezi Park and Kavala cases are
conducive for understanding the relationship between human rights defenders and
autocratic legalism. These cases are of specific importance for documenting the
repressive legal practices against civil society and the endurance dynamics of civic
engagement under dissuasive politics.
The Gezi Park and Kavala cases
On 18 February, the emblematic Gezi Park case of Turkey has ended with a verdict
of acquittal for nine defendants including a group of professionals that are known
for their commitment to civic engagement as businesspersons, lawyers, artists,
architects or civil society representatives. They had been indicted for allegedly trying
to violently overthrow the government by organizing and financing the Gezi Park
protests of 2013 in Istanbul (article 312 of the Criminal Code). Although the Gezi
Park occupation was initially a local demonstration against the construction of a
shopping mall at the city center that has little green space, the protests turned into
a nationwide backlash against the government after harsh response of the police.
Gezi Park, the main venue of protests, was marked as a public space of extra-
parliamentary opposition. It was a jamboree of civic and creative disobedience via
art performances, exhibitions, forums and collective debate. However, due to the
use of force and the riots 15 citizens lost their lives. Significantly, after the Gezi Park
protests the government has intensified its repressions to a point which damaged
Turkey’s democratic consolidation and Europeanization process.
Yet, hours after the “not guilty” verdict that underlines the lack of evidence against
the defendants of Gezi Park, the prominent figure of the case, Osman Kavala, a
businessman and philanthropist who has been accused of being the chief financier
and organizational supporter of Gezi Park uprisings, was re-arrested. His latest
arrest is based on the accusation of his involvement in the attempted coup in July
2016 to overthrow the constitutional order (article 309 of the Criminal Code). The
pro-government media called him a “tycoon with a shady background” or “Turkish
Soros” for his non-profit work with the Open Society Foundation. Besides his
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commercial enterprises, Kavala has supported developmental projects and policy-
based initiatives via think tanks or corporations in the last 25 years.
In fact, Kavala was the only defendant of the Gezi Park case under arrest while
others were either released from detention or tried in absentia because they had
left the country. The Gezi Park protests were brought before the judiciary including
the Constitutional Court in a variety of cases as to the casualties and the use of
improper and excessive violence by police. Making a distinction between peaceful
demonstrators and violent groups taking part in the rioting, the Constitutional Court
upheld the claims of applicants who participated in the protests to exercise their
constitutional rights peacefully as an essential part of democratic society, but
suffered from police violence (see, e.g. Özge Özgürengin Application Nr. 2014/5218,
19 April 2018, Official Gazette 4 July 2018-30468; Ender Ergün Application Nr.
2016/1849, 19 November 2019). It underlined not only the violation of the prohibition
of inhuman or degrading treatment, but the infringement of the right to peaceful
demonstrations. In a decision published shortly after Kavala’s re-arrest on 25
February, the Court has reaffirmed its stance valuing the right to peaceful assembly
in Gezi Park protests (see Eda Aysegul K#l#c Application Nr. 2015/12263, 16
January 2020, Official Gazette 25 February 2020-31050).
Kavala’s acquittal and quick re-arrest represents a Kafkaesque fiction that is
added to the portfolio of the declining rule of law in Turkey. Histreatment by the
judiciary has been heavily condemned by opposition parties and human rights
organizations as a deliberate and cynical detention. 30 bar associations have
called on the Council of Judges and Prosecutors to resign since it has launched
a rapid investigation procedure regarding the judges of the Gezi Park case soon
after President Erdo#an’s harsh criticism of Kavala’s acquittal. The government’s
tight political control over judiciary has become a matter of concern once again.
Additionally, in Kavala’s case there have also been been speculations about a battle
within the judiciary and the government, between progressive and repressive actors.
Legalistic strategies of dissuasive effect
The Gezi Park and Kavala cases represent the account of legalistic strategies of
dissuasive effect and how they work in autocratic transitions. Here, criminalization
is the main strategy, as observed in the freedom of expression cases. Autocratic
legalism uses as devices mainly measures of criminal law, both substantive and
procedural, which are supposed to protect the democratic constitutional order
and due process of law. In the case of Turkey, regular criminal law norms such
as those on overthrowing the government or the constitutional order as well as
defamation or libel suits are increasingly the basis for investigations and trials
against the opponents that are not politically affiliated with the coup attempt in 2016.
The customization of criminal law that becomes operative and flexible according
to the needs of autocratic hegemony is a recurrent pattern. Additionally, the lower
criminal courts that can be controlled by reshuffling and disciplinary investigations
serve as the appropriate agencies of arbitrariness. The trial as a legal process with
substantive guarantees is decoupled from the intrinsic values and boundaries of
lawfulness including procedural fairness and integrity. Judicial professionalism turns
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into bare legal formalism without the quality of justice. Consequently, the lower
judiciary becomes a normative automat of autocratic hegemony and has only an
instrumental value. On the whole, the injustices are not coherent and predictable,
unlike those from the days of military rule in Turkey. In trials against government
critics that deal with identical allegations, like in the Academics for Peace petition
trials, the violations of the right to a fair trial have been strikingly uneven.
Judicial behavior under autocratic legalism
This inherent uncertainty of autocratic legalism, however, produces a dilemma. First,
law is used by the judiciary as a pressure valve to meet the minimum expectations
of European supervision as to the effective remedies. Second, courts seem to enjoy
some autonomy under specific circumstances like in the Gezi Park case. If a majority
on the bench rules in favor of liberty, particularly in the supreme judiciary, this eases
the tensions with the Constitution and case-law of the European Court of Human
Rights. The internal dynamics of progressive judicial behavior need to be further
explored. However, courts remain spaces of contestation and thereby destabilize
autocratic legalism.
As a reminder, Kavala’s very long pre-trial detention – more than two years –
was not considered unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court (Mehmet Osman
Kavala Application Nr. 2018/1073, 22 May 2019, Official Gazette: 28 June
2019-30815). Nevertheless, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in
Kavala v. Turkey (December 2019) has taken the opposite view and demanded
his immediate release. The deference of the lower court to the judgment of the
ECtHR on 18 February 2019 represents itself as a legalistic submissiveness to
the European supervision that provides an argument for a rather formal and only
a partial compliance. Still, the re-arrest undermines the substantive impact of both
European supervision and the very recent judicial reform strategy that was adopted
in consultation with the Council of Europe and the EU Commission with a claim of
strengthening human rights and the rule of law. First, Kavala’s re-arrest is related
to an alleged crime regarding the attempted coup investigated simultaneously with
the Gezi Park allegations. However, Kavala has been released on the basis of
the disproportionality of his pre-trial detention on 11 October 2019 for this alleged
crime. Additionally, the criminal procedural law has been changed on 24 October
2019 by prescribing the upper limit of detentions in line with judicial reform strategy.
Therefore, the re-arrest does not even satisfy the legal standards of the recently
adopted domestic law (article 102 of the Criminal Procedural Code). Second, the
ECtHR has already reviewed in Kavala v. Turkey the allegations as to an attempt
to overthrow the constitutional order by force and violence that are the basis of the
re-arrest. Considering the nature of the alleged crime, the ECtHR underlined that
there should be tangible and verifiable facts or evidence that lead to a reasonable
suspicion and these are not present for Kavala (para. 154-155).
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Endurance dynamics of civil society
The Gezi Park and Kavala cases may help to understand the endurance dynamics
and constraints of the democratic public as an agent of constitutional democracy
under autocratic pressure. These cases document the features of judicial
harassment of civil society, particularly human rights defenders. In Kavala v. Turkey,
the ECtHR considered the correlation between the indictment and public speeches
of President Erdo#an on Kavala’s role in Gezi Park demonstrations. In these
speeches, Kavala has been marked as a terrorist and a financier of riots. Hence, the
ECtHR agreed with the submissions of the Commissioner of Human Rights that the
measures against Kavala have an ulterior purpose, are “part of a wider campaign of
repression against human rights defenders” (para. 229-232). Significantly, they were
likely to have a dissuasive effect on the future work of human rights defenders.
As stated in the joint report of six human rights NGOs for the Universal Periodic
Review 2019, the stigmatization and marginalization of human rights defenders
has become prevalent in Turkey. They take the form of smear campaigns,
defamatory labelling in the media, hostile political speeches by high-profile political
figures, threats and intimidation, the use of violence by the police during peaceful
demonstrations and physical attacks. Released only one day after Kavala’s re-
arrest, the Commissioner of Human Rights draws attention to the “concerted
and continuous pressure exerted on human rights defenders” in form of judicial
proceedings as the most worrying practice (para. 166 of her report).
Although only 9 percent of Turkey’s population is formally registered in civil society
organizations, the civic engagement in unregistered networks in form of informal,
single issue, urban or local platforms constantly increases. Formal membership
of women in associations is low (1.65 percent), but the mobilization of women’s
solidarity networks is strikingly strong. They address governmental policies and
judicial decisions reinforcing gender roles and victim blaming, but they are subject
to vilification, detention, and judicial proceedings as recently observed with respect
to Las Tesis’ performance in December 2019. Besides the variations of dissident
activism, pro-government associations of women, family, children or education,
namely GONGOs, have become empowered actors that collaborate with the public
authorities. They are criticized for receiving extensive financial support for the
realization of a socially conservative agenda of the government and feed clientelist
politics. Consequently, civil society is subject to either selective repression in
the case of human rights defenders or selective empowerment strategies for the
GONGOs. Ambiguous legislation and arbitrary practices such as excessive auditing
facilitate the containment of civil society actors. The recent legislative proposal
prescribing the notification of personal data of members of associations and their
resignations to the provincial governors raises concerns of a shriveling democratic
space.
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Conclusion
The genuine human rights defenders are of specific importance among the
constituents of civil society that are mostly perceived as the key actors to strengthen
the democratic public and constitutional consciousness. This perception reflects
the Tocquevillian assumption regarding civil society and its positive democratizing
capacity, but there is also a theoretically negative assumption that civil society
activism can strengthen autocratic practices due to overreliance on repression
by the ruling elite. Turkey’s vivid civic engagement and human rights defenders
offer a case to test the role of civil society in a setting of autocratic legalism. At
present, it seems essential that civil society should primarily focus on its own
institutional resilience including data-driven knowledge building, documentation,
human capacity, and associative platforms at the local and national level. As the EU
deliberates its strategies and instruments for the neighborhood and development
policies post-2020, it is still recommendable to provide a structured program for the
resilience of the genuine human rights organizations under European Instrument for
Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR).
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